*Is is possible to be wrong about whether or not you are in pain?
*Can a colorblind person know what the rest of humanity experiences when it sees things?
*Can we ever know what it is like to be a bat?
People generally fall into one of two camps on questions of this sort:
- These questions are idiotic, a waste of time, and only really strange and intellectually eccentric people care about them.
- These questions are fascinating, albeit strange, and by thinking about them we can start to understand the phenomenon of mentality.
The vast majority of people is in the first camp. For better or worse, I have always been in the second. This is the province of the Philosophy of Mind, the discipline that seeks, or pretends to seek clarity regarding our notions of what it means to be conscious, have a mind, be a sentient, perceiving being, and not to be a machine, a robot, or a zombie. (The latter category of being is much in vogue today, among philsophers of mind.)
I know of no better guide through this morass than Professor Daniel C. Dennett of Tufts University. His 1991 book, Consciousness Explained is the best thing I have ever read on the topic. His recent short book of lectures that revisits that earlier work, Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness is a great refresher on his ideas. The word science is key: Dennett is trying to use philosophy to clear away intellectual deadwood so that science may advance more rapidly. He rejects the notion that philosophy has a primary role in formulating an explanation of consciousness, and for this he is labeled as reductionist, materialist, physicalist, mechanist, and several other more or less pejorative terms, some of which he is happy to accept, albeit with qualifications.
As a student of philosophy in college, I became disgusted with the narrowminded and dogmatic point of view that dominated the department, and I left to take a degree in art history. One intellectual luminary, who was my personal bête noir, Thomas Nagel, is the subject of frequent, sustained, and devastating criticism by Dennett. Of course, I love that. (Nagel’s essay, What is it like to be a bat? , is a “classic” in the field.)
I have seen Dennett on TV, and read opinion pieces of his in the NYTimes, and he has a tendency towards pugnacious and aggressive humor, but he has a right to it. The people with whom he’s arguing need shaking up. And he’s right! At times, as when he discusses atheism, he seems a bit of a crank, but that too is probably a result of arguing with mystics who think they are scientists. If the arguments of his critics seem, as he presents them, to be utterly ridiculous, that’s because they are. The bigger question is why they continue to be revered as sophisticated philosophical investigators.
These books are not for those seeking an introduction to the topic, and if you are not familiar with the arcane and involved history of these questions in the philosophical literature, you will find them tough going. Sorry, but I don’t know any books that do fit that bill.